
Approved For Releast 6 705/S EGR 19T00975A006200070001-5

25X1



27 January 1962

Copy No. EO-7

25X1

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



25X1

JCS, State Dept. reviews completed

Approved For Releas (20) 205/ G (20) 375/ 3700975A006200070001-5

27 January 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

- 1. OAS: Punta del Este Conference. (Page i)
- 2. Laos: Enemy threat to Nam Tha increases. (Page 11)
- 3. Congo-UN: U Thant warns Adoula not to make martyr of Gizenga. (Page iii)

25X1

- 5. USSR: Moscow rejects US-UK proposal to merge test ban with general disarmament negotiations. (Page iv)
- 6. West Germany Spain Portugal: Defense Minister Strauss tells Salazar Bonn is still interested in air bases in Spain. (Page iv)

25X

- 9. Iran: Bakhtiar's departure from country removes rallying point for opposition elements. (Page v)
- 10. UK-Kenya: British defense officials expect to lose base rights after Kenyan independence. (Page vi)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 January 1962

DAILY BRIEF

*OAS: Conference delegations appear to have reached general agreement that the Castro regime should be excluded from the OAS on grounds that its system of government is incompatible with the organization's principles. The legal basis and timing of Cuba's exclusion is providing a basis for considerable controversy, however, with Brazil apparently pressing most strongly for prolonging the process. By a vote of two thirds of the 21 OAS members, the present foreign ministers' conference could convert itself into a special inter-American conference which some members believe would be competent to amend the OAS charter to exclude the present Cuban Government from future OAS meetings. The strong interest of most Latin Americans in legal questions, however, may lead even strongly anti-Castro delegations to seek an interim period for legal consultations before amending the OAS charter.

Members of the Communist party of Uruguay, leftistoriented labor unions, and pro-Cuba committees are
to go out on the streets of Montevideo without awaiting further orders, as soon as they hear
that measures have been taken against Cuba at the meeting in
Punta del Este. The first assigned task is said to be to set
fire to the US Embassy. Pro-Castro groups staged a successful demonstration in Montevideo on 23 January with an estimated
attendance of 12,000.

25X1

i

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A006200070001-5

Laos: The tactical situation at Nam Tha in northwestern Laos is deteriorating, according to a MAAG report of 26 January. One of the two government infantry battalions in the area has been overrun by enemy forces estimated at four battalions. Phoumi is planning to airlift a relief battalion to Nam Tha from Pakse, in southern Laos, beginning 27 January

Chief MAAG, recounting the series of reverses suffered this month by government forces after attempting advances into enemy-held territory in northern and central Laos, notes that Phoumi's troops have been forced to withdraw in each case after putting up no more than token resistance. He warns that if Phoumi continues to push against sensitive enemy spots, his troops will be routed. Chief MAAG notes that the Lao army-both officers and men-suffers from an almost pathological fear of North Vietnamese troops, and, despite improvements since the cease-fire last May, continues to have serious weaknesses, especially in leadership and motivation.

Phoumi, on 26 January, said he was considering an appeal to the UN--after first informing the Geneva conference-for help against the buildup of North Vietnamese strength in Laos and the worsening military situation. Vientiane, meanwhile, has reported the Nam Tha situation to the ICC as a cease-fire violation and requested an investigation. Phoumi, who has received support from the King and the cabinet for his stand against relinquishing the defense and interior posts in a coalition government, feels that the Communists are resorting to military pressure in an effort to regain the political initiative in Laos.

25X1

25X1

27 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

that a meeting at this time would merely provide a forum for a Soviet attack on the secretary general. Britain, which holds the council presidency this month, indicated it will be slow in

consulting members about the Soviet request and in scheduling

25X

25X1

any meeting. (Backup, Page I)

27 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

iii

USSR: Although Moscow had previously urged that the test ban question be solved "interdependently" with general and complete disarmament, the USSR now has rejected the US-UK proposal to merge the current test ban negotiations with the broader disarmament negotiations scheduled to begin in Geneva on 14 March. At the 26 January session of the test ban talks Soviet delegate Tsarapkin read a government statement which insisted on continuing the three-power talks in their present form. Tsarapkin also insisted that the test ban conference participants should negotiate on the basis of the Soviet proposal for a ban on atmospheric, outer space, and underwater tests, using national detection means for control purposes, with a moratorium on underground tests.

The Soviet turnabout is probably designed to maneuver the West into a position where Moscow's propaganda could blame the US for a breakdown of the talks. In the event of a rupture the USSR may seek formal UN approval of its proposal for a ban on tests without any international controls. Soviet leaders may also calculate that the impasse over the question of continuing negotiations will lead to a resumption of US tests in the atmosphere, which would provide a pretext for the USSR to claim that it had no choice but to continue with its own nuclear testing. The Soviet Government is on record with frequent warnings that US underground tests and plans for atmospheric tests leave the USSR free to resume testing in the interests of its security.

25X1

25X1

West Germany - Spain - Portugal: The US Embassy in Lisbon has learned from a reliable source that West German Defense Minister Strauss, on a recent unpublicized visit to Lisbon, told Prime Minister Salazar and Army Minister Mario Silva that Bonn has a continuing interest in obtaining air bases in Spain. Early in 1960 an attempt by West Germany to negotiate

27 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T009754006200070001-25X1

27 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

vi

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200070001-5

Adoula's Plans for Gizenga

MGizenga's personal safety may well be in danger from conflicts between pro- and anti-Gizengist factions. On 26 January pro-Gizengists demonstrated outside the US Embassy, apparently reacting to rumors that Gizenga had been killed. US Ambassador Gullion believes that Adoula personally is determined to adhere to the legal forms in his effort to punish and exclude Gizenga from public life, but that a long "Lumumbalike" captivity--which Adoula apparently envisages--presents obvious dangers. Gizenga now is being held in a military camp after being turned over by the UN to Congolese authorities -at his own request. Gullion says Adoula has instructed Surete Chief Nendaka to see that 'no harm was to come to Gizenga' and that he was to see no one "who might cause him trouble." The pro-Gizengist radicals fear and distrust Nendaka, and Minister of Interior Gbenye recently tried unsuccessfully to have him ousted.

Adoula, according to Gullion, is confident he has both Gizenga and his erstwhile followers under control or effectively neutralized. He is still undecided, however, on what legal form to use against Gizenga, and Gullion expects no decision prior to Adoula's completion of his cabinet reorganization. Adoula expressed confidence that the Congo parliament would follow his lead, but "dozens" of members feared that lifting Gizenga's parliamentary immunity would "open Pandora's box" for similar action against them. A dossier of charges against Gizenga is still under preparation.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

British Pessimistic on Holding Bases in Kenya

Despite their pessimism, British defense officials have no immediate plans for withdrawal from Kenya and hope that agreement may be possible on a phase-out period of up to five years and on "staging through" air rights utilized on an occasional basis. British officials realize this period may be shortened by increasing local opposition.

As early as last November the opposition party in the Kenya legislature, which has a good chance of forming the government after Kenya becomes an independent state, presented a motion demanding British military withdrawal "without delay" after independence. Pressure from inside the country and from other African states would make it extremely difficult for even a moderate African government to allow the British bases to remain. Moreover, officials in London feel that even if such permission could be obtained, an independent Kenya government would impose such stringent conditions that the bases would be useless.

The army camp and airfield near Nairobi and the naval station at Mombasa make up Britain's Kenya bases. London would find it hard if not impossible to replace their facilities for accommodating Britain's overseas strategic reserve. The Defense White Paper due in late February or March will probably indicate a long-term shift in policy involving reductions in forces stationed overseas and reliance on a mobile UK-based strategic reserve supplemented by naval task forces in critical areas.

This plan, however, will not make up for the loss of the Kenya bases if political developments force an accelerated withdrawal. In that case Aden would assume increased importance for London's security interests in the Persian Gulf area now that Arab states refuse it overflight rights. Although Aden is inferior to Kenya in training facilities and living conditions, the present garrison of 4,000 British troops could be strengthened enough so that, with forces in Singapore and naval units in the general area. it could deal with limited local hostilities.

25X1

25X1

25X1

```
THE PRESIDENT
```

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

